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Abstract 
Guanting Reservoir is one of the main sources of water to Beijing, and has had poor water quality since 1997. This has to some 
extent been due to a water-use dispute between Zhangjiakou (upstream) and Beijing (downstream) in the Guanting Reservoir 
Basin. Ecological compensation is a powerful economic incentive, and was thus chosen in this study as a model to settle the 
dispute. We established a model which consisted of revenue functions of Beijing and Zhangjiakou, respectively, to calculate the 
ecological compensation under various situations. The revenue functions included socio-economic benefits of water, pollution 
control cost, and environmental externalities in the downstream area. The environmental externalities included both financial and 
ecological losses when water sharing of the upstream area was outside the initial property distribution. Based on the revenue 
functions, we calculated the exact payment in a dispute, considering the profit of both the upstream and downstream areas.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Review of previous work 
Rivers are among the water bodies most vulnerable to pollution. In China, the overall quality of the water of 
seven major rivers is subject to intermediate pollution. Excessive water consumption as a result of market 
ineffectiveness leads to water shortage and pollution, and so river basin environmental protections remain inefficient. 
Nowadays, ecological compensation is an economic incentive widely utilized in river basin environmental 
protection worldwide[1], including China[2]. Internationally, it has been applied as ‘Payment for Ecological Services 
(PES)’ and ‘Payment for Ecological Benefit’ [3]. The World Bank has carried out PES projects in Costa Rica, 
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Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia, mainly by increasing forest cover to improve the water service [4, 5]. In China, 
ecological compensation practice is still in a preliminary stage.  
There is no accepted definition of river basin ecological compensation. Some take it as payments for the 
ecological services of water trading [3, 4, 6, 7], while others take it for institutional arrangements provided by 
governments using economic incentives to maintain and improve the ecological services of a drainage basin [8]. 
Ecological compensation can be calculated in various ways [9]. On one hand, it can be calculated based on ecological 
benefits provided by environmental protections. Ecuador established a Trust Compensation Fund in 1998 to collect 
finance from water users, based on the revenue functions of each stakeholder [10]. Due to increased soil salinization 
of the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia caused by deforestation, the upstream farmers should pay AU$17/1000 
m3 of water or AU$85/ha to compensate for the standard payment over a ten-year period [11]. On the other hand, 
ecological compensation can also be determined by the environmental protection cost. In the Forest Environmental 
Services Compensation in Costa Rica, the compensation standard is 30US$/ha/y, based on the opportunity cost of 
land-use instead of the value of hydrological services [12]. The Perrier Vittel Company paid 75% of the disposable 
income of affected farms in France as compensation, based on the opportunity cost of arable land-use to get high 
water-quality [13].  
From the macro perspective, the water-compensation accounting based on either the environmental protection 
cost or environmental benefits provided by protections in upstream can eliminate the downstream ‘free-rider’ 
phenomenon. However, research on each stakeholder is inadequate. Some studies have announced that 
compensation accounting should include the ecosystem service changes and impacts on stakeholders [14], and others 
have claimed that it should include the estimated cost, willingness to pay and capability to pay [15]. However, an 
accounting system meeting both the rational preferences of upstream and downstream has not yet been established 
and is still in a phase of qualitative description. In this case, the payments will not be acceptable to either upstream 
or downstream area because of lack of full consideration of each other’s position, and this leads to inefficient 
implementation of ecological compensation.  
1.2. Study area 
Beijing, the capital of China, is suffering a water shortage. Guanting Reservoir, one of the main sources of water 
to Beijing, has had poor water quality since 1997. Ninety-seven percent of the water entering into Guanting 
Reservoir comes from Zhangjiakou City. With rapid socio-economic development, the contradiction between water 
supply and demand in Beijing has become increasingly pronounced. For this reason, ‘The plan for sustainable use of 
water resources of the capital in early 21st Century (2001–2005)’ (‘21st plan’) was approved by the State Council to 
restore the drinking water supply function of the Guanting Reservoir. Thus, a fair and sustainable solution to water 
use disputes in the Guanting Reservoir Basin has become a common concern.  
Ecological compensation, although still in a preliminary stage in China, was chosen in this research to solve this 
problem due to its powerful incentive effect as described above. How to establish an accounting system which can 
be accepted by both cities remains crucial. In this study, we established an ecological compensation accounting 
system based on the revenue functions of Beijing and Zhangjiakou. This accounting system includes estimates of 
environmental externality (to Beijing caused by Zhangjiakou) of both finance and ecology. In this way, we obtained 
payments that considered the profit of both stakeholders of water use disputes. Ecological compensation that 
supports the ecological service transactions between Beijing and Zhangjiakou would greatly improve the 
development of fairness and sustainability in the Guanting Reservoir Basin.  
Guanting Reservoir watershed (41°14.2'–38°51'N, 112°8.3'–116°20.6'E) is located on the Yongding River, about 
80 km northwest of Beijing. It is one of the main sources of water to Beijing. The large amount of water use for 
agriculture in the upstream city of Zhangjiakou has resulted in water consumption exceeding the capacity of 
Yongding River. Guanting Reservoir ceased providing water to Beijing in 1997 as a result of continual deterioration 
in water quality [16]. With the increasing water demand of Beijing, restoration of Guanting Reservoir has become 
urgent. It is an important task of the ‘21st plan’ to restore the drinking water supply function of Guanting Reservoir. 
The water quality measured across the Bridge Eight section, which is the Hebei–Beijing provincial trans-boundary 
section of the Yongding River, is expected to have reached Grade III of GB 3838-2002 (Environmental quality 
standards for surface water of China) by 2010. It is assumed that the water inflow to Guanting will be 120 million 
m3 at 75% assuring probabilities in 2010. However, the inflow quality of Guanting Reservoir remains worse than 
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Grade V, and the reservoir water quality at Grade V. Additionally, the average inflow was only 113 million m3 
during 2000–2006 [17]. All these facts indicate that management of powerful incentives toward environmental 
protection in this area is needed. 
2. Methodology  
We attempted to establish a market for water ecological service transactions between Beijing and Zhangjiakou. 
The optimal allocation of resources would work through the market transactions, leading to sustainable water use in 
this basin instead of over-consumption. Two elements are required to run these transactions. One is the clarity of 
water property rights of the two regions in Guanting Reservoir Basin, and the other is accurate payments supporting 
the transactions which are acceptable to both stakeholders. The payments can be calculated with an accounting 
system which can quantify the profit of each city during a water-use dispute in the Guanting Reservoir Basin. 
Followings are two parts to explain the clarity and the accounting system.   
2.1. Clarity of Property Rights 
To safeguard the water resources and sustainable development of regional economies in Beijing and its upstream 
area, the State Council approved the ‘21st plan’ in 2001. This plan was compiled by Beijing, Zhangjiakou, Chende 
and Datong. It forecasts the particular emissions and water share of the upstream area above Beijing in Guanting 
Reservoir Basin in 2010. Based on that, it designed the objectives, i.e. by the year 2010 the water quality across 
Bridge Eight section will have reached Grade III, and the inflow to Guanting is 120 million m3 at 75% assuring 
probabilities. This plan is equated to an agreement in law signed by Beijing and the upstream cities. Thus, in this 
study we took the planning objectives, the quality and quantity of inflow to Guanting, as the initial water rights and 
emission permit allocations between Zhangjiakou and Beijing. Based on the clarity of property, we calculated the 
cost of behavior beyond the initial property boundaries of each city through the market. In this way, the ecological 
services transactions may work.  
2.2. Model of  The Accounting System 
We established a model of the accounting system which consisted of revenue functions of Beijing and 
Zhangjiakou, respectively, to quantify the profit of each city during water use in the Guanting Reservoir Basin. The 
revenue function of Zhangjiakou consisted of benefits from water use and cost for environmental protection. The 
revenue function of Beijing, consisted of water use benefit and the environmental externalities, financial loss, and 
ecological loss or benefit, caused by water pollution or protection in the upstream area. The ecological compensation 
between the two cities could be determined by the rational choices of each stakeholder, which were quantified 
through the established revenue functions.  
2.2.1. General Structure of The Model 
The allocation of water between the two cities was set up according to the prediction of water share between the 
two areas in Guanting Reservoir Basin in the ‘21st plan’. For each area, the use of water resource was divided into 
three parts: for agriculture, industry, and living. The proportion of the three parts depends on the features of each 
area, and is modified by the coefficient of each part. The sector’s structure is displayed in Fig 1. 
2.2.1.1. Case I 
Case I assumed that excessive sewage was produced in Zhangjiakou, and the quality of water across the Bridge 
Eight section in the Yongding River was Grade IV or V, which is worse than the Grade III objective. In this case, 
Zhangjiakou caused negative environmental externalities to Beijing, including financial and ecological losses. Thus, 
Zhangjiakou should pay ecological compensation to Beijing.  
2.2.1.1.1. Revenue of  Upstream Area Sector 
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In Case I, the revenue function of Zhangjiakou consisted of two parameters, the benefit of water use and the ecological compensation for Beijing. 
The benefit of water use comprised three parts: for agriculture, industry and living (indicating economic and social benefits of water use in 
Zhangjiakou).  
 
Fig. 1. The model of water resource allocation 
2.2.1.1.2. Revenue of  Downstream Area Sector 
In Case I the revenue function of Beijing consisted of four parameters: the benefit of water use, the financial and the ecological loss caused by 
excessive sewage produced in Zhangjiakou, and the compensation paid by Zhangjiakou for its excessive sewage emission as clarified above. The 
benefit of water use comprised three parts: for agriculture, industry and living (indicating the economic and social benefits of water use in 
Beijing). The ecological loss comprised four parts: biological diversity, habitat, landscape and historical culture, and recreation losses. We used 
the contingent valuation method (CVM), involving 300 questionnaires to estimate the value of these ecological services. The result was shown in 
detail below (in the parameters section 3.2.2.2). The financial loss comprised three parts: agriculture, industry and social losses. The ecological 
compensation was equal to financial loss plus ecological loss of the downstream area, Beijing, when the upstream area’s additional socio-
economic benefits of water use are greater than the financial and ecological losses. Otherwise, it is equal to the additional socio-economic 
benefits of the upstream area.  
2.2.1.2. Case II 
Case II assumed that the environmental protection worked well in the upstream area, Zhangjiakou, and the 
quality of water across the Bridge Eight section was Grade II, better than the planning objective of Grade III. In that 
case, Zhangjiakou caused advantageous environmental externalities to Beijing, including financial and ecological 
benefits. In other words, the water right Beijing received was beyond the initial property boundaries as previously 
clarified. Thus, Beijing should pay ecological compensation to Zhangjiakou for its extra pollution control costs. 
There are separate sectors for upstream and downstream revenue functions. 
2.2.1.2.1. Revenue of  Upstream Area Sector 
In Case II, the revenue function of Zhangjiakou consisted of three parameters: the benefit of water use, the extra 
cost for pollution control, and the ecological compensation paid by Beijing. The benefit of water use comprised 
three parts: water use for agriculture, industry and living (i.e. economic and social benefits during water use in 
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Zhangjiakou).  The extra cost for pollution control in Zhangjiakou depended on the quality of the water in Yongding 
River. The formula of the ‘water quality–economic losses’ was displayed in the parameters section 3.2.2.1, and was 
constructed using the results of previous studies.  
2.2.1.2.2. Revenue of  Downstream Area Sector 
In Case II the revenue function of Beijing consisted of three parameters: the benefit of water use, the ecological 
benefit caused by extra pollution control in Zhangjiakou, and the compensation paid to Zhangjiakou for the water 
right Beijing received which was beyond the initial property boundaries as clarified previously. The benefit of water 
use comprised three parts: water use for agriculture, industry and living (i.e. economic and social benefits during 
water use in Beijing). The ecological benefit comprised four parts: biological diversity, habitat, landscape and 
historical culture, and recreation benefits. We used the CVM method, involving 300 questionnaires to estimate the 
value of these ecological services. The result was shown in detail below (in the parameter section 3.2.2.2). The 
ecological compensation is equal to the pollution control cost to upstream area (Zhangjiakou) when the downstream 
area’s (Beijing) additional ecological benefit is greater than the cost. Otherwise, it is equal to the additional 
ecological benefit to the downstream area. 
2.2.2. Parameters of The Model 
2.2.2.1. The Benefits of Water Use – W (q, L) 
The accounting of socio-economic benefits of different water quality and quantity for use was divided into two 
parts. The benefit was calculated at the same quantity as used for water quality of Grade III . In addition, the socio-
economic system losses caused by water pollution under the present situation were calculated. Econometric methods 
were used to account the economic losses, and used as a correction term for the benefits of water use under different 
water qualities. Therefore, the social and economic benefit of water use was as below. 
W(q,L) = f(q) – g(q,L)                    (1) 
where q is regional water consumption, and L is water quality. 
(A) The benefits of production and living water-use – f (q ) 
 
f(q) = f1 + f2 + f3=  
3
)1(
12
)1](
10000
[
1
)1](/)([ qxtrSqxtrf
i
q
qxtrCMV
oi
Y
i
Y uu EH    (2) 
 
where f1 is the benefit of water for agriculture; f2 for industry; f3 for life; q is the total water consumption in the 
region; x1 is the water quantity coefficient of water for agriculture in the region; x2 water quantity coefficient of 
water for industry in the region; x3 water quantity coefficient of water for life in the region; İ is the sharing 
coefficient for the benefits of irrigation; Yi is the yield of irrigation crops (kg/ha); Yoi is the yield of dry-land crops 
(kg/ha); V is the crop prices (CNY/kg); M is the irrigation quota (m3/ha); C is the costs of water supply in irrigated 
areas (CNY/m3); qi is the water consumption of 10 000 CNY output value (m3/10 000 CNY); ß is the sharing 
coefficient for industrial water supply; f is the net rate of output; S1 is the price of water for life (yuan /m3); and r is 
the annual interest rate (%). 
(B) The correction term of water quality – g (q, L) 
Accounting the loss in a socio-economic system caused by pollution, as a correction term, is as follows [18]. 
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where ǻFi (I = 1, 2, 3) is the loss of water for agriculture, industry and life; Ki is the largest potential economic 
loss coefficient of water pollution for each category of water use; Mi is the symmetrical turning point of the 
economic loss for categories of water quality; Į is the price factor of water pollution for each category of water use; 
L is the level of water quality, and LTH is the level of water quality at the inflection point in the ‘water quality-
economic losses’ curve. Other parameters are the same as in Formula (2). 
2.2.2.2. Aquatic Ecosystem Service Value Changes Depend On Water Quality – E(q, L) 
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Using the CVM method, involving 300 questionnaires concerning Guanting Reservoir, this study estimated the 
aquatic ecosystem service values for biodiversity, species habitat, recreation, and landscape and historical culture, in 
the Guanting Reservoir (Fig 2). 
 
 
Fig.2. Willingness to pay for ecosystem services value. 
In this study, the relationship between water quality and ecological services value was simulated as the S-curve 
of environmental economics. Different values of ecosystem services (E) from the Guanting Reservoir were obtained 
when the level of water quality in the section was better or worse than Grade III. 
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Where
-(1/Ent-3)
-(1/En-3)
1/ (1+e )
1/ (1+e )  is the correction factor for willingness to pay for the ecosystem services for t years later [19]; 
e is the natural logarithm; and En is the Engel coefficient. Other parameters are the same as in the former types. 
2.2.2.3. The Cost of Water Pollution Control – I (L, Ls) 
The formula of water pollution control cost was listed below [20]. 
CODeI uu 0074.04976.0                               (5) 
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where I is total cost of water pollution control (CNY); and COD is the value of chemical oxygen demand  content 
(mg). 
3. Results and discussion 
The model ran with a time-step of one stage spanning four stages with Stage 1 being the base stage and Stage 4 
the target stage. The water quantity across the Bridge Eight section was set according to the prediction of the 
particular water-share of the upstream area above Beijing in Guanting Reservoir Basin in the ‘21st plan’. The 
coefficients of each parameter (e.g. sharing coefficients of irrigation and of industry) in the model were set 
according to results of previous studies. 
3.1. Case I  
The inflow quality to Guanting Reservoir was still worse than Grade V. Case I assumed that the quality of the 
inflow was Grade V in Stage 1, Grade V in Stage 2, Grade IV in Stage 3, and Grade III in Stage 4. The ecological 
compensation was equal to the extra socio-economic benefits Zhangjiakou received from excessive water use and 
releasing sewage beyond the initial property boundaries as clarified in the ‘21st plan’. The exact ecological 
compensation Zhangjiakou should pay Beijing in Stage 1 with inflow of Grade V quality was 2,215,685,134.67 
CNY; in Stage 2 with Grade V inflow was 2,215,859,808.61 CNY; in Stage 3 with Grade IV inflow was 
1,704,114,033.96 CNY; and in Stage 4 with Grade III inflow was 0.  
 
In the first three stages, when the water quality across the Bridge Eight section was worse than the planning 
objective of Grade III, Zhangjiakou should pay Beijing ecological compensation since it would cause negative 
environmental externalities to Beijing. The payments were the exact extra socio-economic benefits it received by 
excessive water use and releasing sewage beyond the initial property boundaries as clarified in the ‘21st plan’. Thus 
the net revenue of Zhangjiakou in Stages 1–2 did not increase. In this condition, being censured for pollution and 
getting no extra financial benefit, Zhangjiakou no longer had any motivation for excessive water consumption. As a 
result, the illegal water rights of Zhangjiakou would be gradually transferred back to Beijing. This reached a balance 
in Stage 4, and by that time, the ecological compensation was 0, and the net revenues of both Beijing and 
Zhangjiakou were at a maximum. 
As the ecological compensation was the extra benefit Zhangjiakou received, not the environmental externalities 
caused in Beijing during this water dispute, the payments were always less than the financial and ecological losses. 
This shows that the accounting system was always based on the revenue, not losses, of each city. In other words, the 
payments were always within the capability of Zhangjiakou, since the accounting system considered the profit and 
supported the rational choice of Zhangjiakou. 
In fact, the water allocation between Zhangjiakou and Beijing in the first three stages deviated from the condition 
of efficiency in the Guanting Reservoir Basin. The inefficient resource allocation could not satisfy the qualification 
of market transactions. In this case, the payments between the two stakeholders could not cover the real value of the 
ecological services. However, without the motivation for excessive consumption by Zhangjiakou as discussed above, 
water resource allocation between the two cities would return to the initial distribution of water use and emission 
rights as required in the ‘21st plan’. By that time, there would be optimal water resource allocation between Beijing 
and Zhangjiakou. Under the conditions of optimal water allocation between Beijing and Zhangjiakou, the ecological 
services transactions would cease, and the ecological compensation decrease to zero. This ensures efficient 
development of the basin and with efficient development, each area obtains maximum profit. The rational choice by 
each area is to maximize profit and the accounting system supports this process through ecological compensation. 
Thus, the accounting system supported the rational choices by both stakeholders, and as a result, this accounting 
system should be acceptable to each area during the water dispute. 
3.2. Case II  
The inflow quality to Guanting Reservoir was below Grade V. Case II assumed that the quality of the inflow was 
Grade III in Stage 1, Grade II in Stage 2, Grade III in Stage 3, and Grade III in Stage 4. The ecological 
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compensation was equal to the additional ecological benefit to the downstream area (Beijing) due to extra pollution 
control carried out upstream (Zhangjiakou). The ecological compensation Beijing should pay Zhangjiakou in Stage 
2 when the inflow quality was Grade II was 588,234,347.94 CNY; however, in Stages 1, 2 and 4 when the inflow 
quality was Grade III, the compensation was 0 in each scenario.  
In Stage 2, Beijing paid Zhangjiakou the extra ecological benefit it got as ecological compensation. That means 
to get extra ecological services beyond the initial property distribution in the ‘21st plan’, Beijing has to pay money 
equal to the additional ecological services value which was estimated by 300 questionnaires in this study. That is 
why the net revenue of Beijing increased slowly and continually instead of reaching a maximum in Stage 2. On the 
other hand, Zhangjiakou spent significant amounts on extra pollution control, which was more than the ecological 
compensation Beijing paid. Thus the revenue of Zhangjiakou declined sharply in Stage 2. 
As the ecological compensation was the extra ecological benefit Beijing received, not the pollution control cost 
that Zhangjiakou spent, the payments were less than the environmental protection cost in Zhangjiakou. This shows 
that the accounting system was always based on the revenues of each city instead of the environmental protection 
cost. Thus, the payments were always within the capability of Beijing, as the accounting system considered the 
profit and supported the rational choice of Beijing.  
In fact, when the environmental protection cost in the upstream area was more than the additional ecological 
benefit accrued in the downstream area, it indicated that the relationship between environmental protection and 
socio-economic development in the Guanting Reservoir Basin had deviated from the comprehensive, coordinated 
and sustainable development principles and should be amended. In this condition, without sufficient economic 
incentives and following the rational choice, Zhangjiakou would cut pollution control costs. Thus water quality 
would decline to Grade III, and remain at the balance of the initial property distribution. Then, the ecological 
services transactions would cease, and the ecological compensation decrease to zero. This would ensure efficient 
development of this basin, and with efficient development each area would get maximum profit. The rational choice 
of each area is to maximize profit and the accounting system supports this process through ecological compensation. 
Thus, this accounting system supports the rational choice of each stakeholder, and so this accounting should be 
acceptable by each area during this water dispute. 
4. Conclusion 
The clarity of water rights and emission rights between regions in the upstream and downstream is the basis of 
ecological compensation accounting. Compensation mode is bidirectional. In this study, the planning objective of 
"21st Century (2001-2005), the capital of sustainable water resources planning" was taken as the initial water right 
allocation. In CASE I, as the entry worse than target water quality, Zhangjiakou should pay ecological compensation 
to Beijing; in CASE II, as the entry better than water quality objectives, Beijing should pay ecological compensation 
to Zhangjiakou conversely. 
Indirect environmental externalities (ecological damage or eco-efficiency) should be into the accounting system 
of compensation. Using of CVM, this paper assessed the value of water ecosystem services in the Guanting 
reservoir areas. Based on assessment results, by drawing the S curve in “water quality - economic losses”, the 
difference value between of ecosystem services varies water quality were accounted to characterization the indirect 
environmental externalities of water activities of Zhangjiakou to Beijing. 
 We tried to establish a model which consisted of revenue functions of Beijing and Zhangjiakou respectively to 
quantify the profit of each city during water use. Considering the profit of each stakeholder, we calculated the exact 
payment when the water quality and quantity of the provincial trans-boundary section were in various situations. In 
that way, a market for water ecological service transactions, supported by ecological compensation, between Beijing 
and Zhangjiakou was established. The optimal allocation of water resources would work through the market 
transactions, leading to sustainable water use in this basin. The results indicated that: when the water quality of 
inflow to Beijing, was worse than National Water Quality Standard III, Zhangjiakou needed to pay Beijing the extra 
socio-economic water use benefits comparing to the initial right instead of the financial and ecological loss in 
Beijing under poor water quality; when the water quality of inflow was better than National Water Quality Standard 
III, Beijing needed to pay Zhangjiakou the additional ecological benefit comparing to the initial right instead of the 
pollution control cost spend in Zhangjiakou. 
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